Two-stage network games modeling the Belt and Road Initiative
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu10.2022.107Abstract
Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, we introduce a model of two-stage network games, when players first form a directed network (the first stage) and then they may reconsider the actions made at the first stage and choose controls to influence other players in a positive or negative way (the second stage). At both stages players get their payoffs. Considering a cooperative version of the game, we examine the problem of subgame network consistency and design an imputation distribution procedure as a new system of stage payments to guarantee the long-term cooperation. The Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint is used as a cooperative solution concept. Finally, we prove that a cooperative subgame is convex which ensures the non-emptiness of the core.
Keywords:
network games, subgame consistency, imputation distribution procedure, the Shapley value, directed graph, convex game
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Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Applied Mathematics. Computer Science. Control Processes" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
